A Model of Financial Pyramid with Quasi-Rational Participants

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Resumo

A model of a financial pyramid is proposed in which each participant makes a decision about entering and exiting the pyramid based on the maximin principle using his (or her) ideas about the characteristics of other participants. If the pyramid organizers are able to carry out the whole process quickly enough (so that the payoffs to agents who participated in the pyramid and left it in time do not matter too much), then exactly those agents who overestimated the share of losers in the total mass of agents will lose.

Sobre autores

N. Kukushkin

Dorodnicyn Computing Center, Federal Research Center “Computer Science and Control,” Russian Academy of Sciences; Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology

Autor responsável pela correspondência
Email: ququns@inbox.ru
119333, Moscow, Russia; 141700, Dolgoprudnyi, Moscow oblast, Russia

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